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PORTAL-TO-PORTAL pay had hardly passed from the judicial spotlight
before a new disruptive element appeared to complicate administration
of the Fair Labor Standards Act.' This time the explosive subject of
"overtime-on-overtime" occupied the center of the stage. Before the
Court were the familiar provisions of Section 7(a) of the Act:
"No employer shall . . . employ any of his employees . . . for
a workweek longer than forty hours . . . unless such employee re-
ceives compensation for his employment in excess of the hours
above specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times the
regular rate at which he is employed." 2
The undefined statutory "regular rate" had been consistently inter-
preted as the rate actually paid for time normally or regularly worked.
A considerable segment of American industry had based many of its
overtime pay practices upon the generally accepted converse of that
interpretation: that premium payments for time not normally or regu-
larly worked were not part of the "regular rate" and were creditable
to the overtime compensation required by the Act. With the advent
of the Supreme Court's decision in Bay Ridge Operating Co. v. Aaron,5
however, the overtime pay structure based upon that proposition was
rendered vestigial. As the sole standard for future overtime pay policy,
the Court announced the criterion of excessiveness of hours: only pay-
ments made because of work in excess of a specified number of hours
previously worked in the workday or workveek constitute true over-
time payments.
Many types of wage payments, historically regarded as within the
overtime pay category, may now have to be included in the regular
1 Members of the New York Bar.
1. 52 STAT. 1060 (1938), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1940).
2. Id. at 1063,29 U.S.C. §207 (a) (1940).
3. See p. 354 and note 25 infra.
4. See p. 363 infra.
5. 334 U.S. 446 (1948), rehearing dcnied, October 11, 1948, affirning 163 F2d 65
(2nd Cir. 1947) which had reversed 69 F. Supp. 956 (S.D.N.Y. 1947) reportcd mub norn.
Addison v. Huron Stevedoring Corp. See Note, 16 U. Cmr. L. Rxv. 116 (1948).
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rate upon which statutory overtime is computed. The result is that
the much-discussed "overtime-on-overtime" must be paid by em-
ployers. Although interpretations of the Administrator of the Wage
and Hour Division,6 operating within the limits permitted by the Bay
Ridge case, may furnish temporary relief, a satisfactory solution of the
problems created by the decision will be achieved only by legislative
action. Much of the legislation proposed, however, is of doubtful value.
A necessary prerequisite to appraisal of these measures is an examina-
tion of pre-Bay Ridge attempts to give content to "regular rate." Once
the history has been traced, a proper focus will be provided for deter-
mining the exact nature of the problem raised by the case and the
adequacy of legislative solutions already in process.
INTERPRETATION OF REGbLAR RATE PRIOR TO THE BAY RIDGE CASE
Prior to the Bay Ridge case, Supreme Court decisions on the validity
of wage payment practices under Section 7(a) of the Fair Labor Stand-
ards Act had followed a course from which the result but not the reason-
ing of the Bay Ridge case could have been foreseen. The Court had
repeatedly emphasized that the statutory "regular rate" was the rate
in fact received for the hours normally or regularly worked.' Con-
tractual attempts to specify a "regular rate" different from the one in
fact received had, with only one exception,8 been consistently rebuffed.
The criteria which furnished the basis for subsequent interpretation
of "regular rate" were established in the very first case which came
before the court, Overnight Transportation Co. v. Missel. Confronted
with a plaintiff-employee receiving a fixed weekly wage for a fluctuating
work-week averaging sixty-five hours (with no provision for overtime
compensation and no record of any ever having been paid), the Court
6. The Administrator has from time to time issued interpretations relative to the
computation of statutory regular rate. Section 7(a), however, does not afford the Admin-
istrator express authority to prescribe rules and regulations for its administration. His
interpretations are thus merely advisory of the construction of the law which the Ad-
ministrator then believes to be correct, and are subject to contrary interpretations by the
courts and to change by the Administrator if he subsequently decides them to be incorrect.
See 29 CoDE FED. REGs. § 775.1 (Supp. 1946) ; 29 CoDa FED. RE4s. § 778.2 (13 Fr. Ra.
4534 (1948)). Since "passage of The Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, 61 STAT. 84, 29
U.S.C.A. §§216, 251-262 (1947), effective May 14, 1947, these interpretations have in-
creased in importance because of the so-called "good faith defense!' provisions of that Act.
See pages 364, and note 44 infra.
7. Overnight Motor Transportation Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572 (1942) ; Walling v.
Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 323 U.S. 37 (1944); United States v. Rosenwasser, 323 U.S.
360 (1945); Walling v. Youngerman-Reynolds Hardwood Co., 325 U.S. 419 (1945);
Walling v. Harnischfeger Corp., 325 U.S. 427 (1945) ; 149 Madison Ave, Corp. v, Asselta,
331 U.S. 199 (1947).
8. Walling v. A.H. Belo Corp., 316 U.S. 624 (1942).
9. 316 U.S. 572 (1942).
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ruled that the Act had been violated. Short shrift was made of the em-
ployer's contention that the requirements of the Act were met as long as
the fixed weekly wage was at least equal to the statutory minimum rate
plus one and one-half times that rate for the overtime hours. Instead,
it held that payment for overtime at one and one-half times the regular
pay is required-whether that pay is at, or above, the minimum. The
Court then established the following guides for determining the statu-
tory "regular rate": (1) the Act contemplates payment at an hourly
rate, but payment by the week, to be reduced by some method of
computation to hourly rates, is also covered; (2) the week is the unit
of time under Section 7(a) within which to distinguish regular time
from overtime; (3) where the employment contract is for a fixed
weekly wage for regular contract hours and those are the actual hours
worked, wages divided by hours equal regular rate; (4) where the em-
ployment contract is for a fixed weekly wage, with variable or fluctuat-
ing hours, the same method of computation produces the regular rate
for each week.
The rule had hardly been formulated before an exception was carved
out-on the very same day. In the Belo case, 10 individual employment
contracts provided for a guaranteed weekly wage for a fluctuating
number of hours; the hourly rate was fixed at 1/60 of the weekly wage;
and express provision was made for time-and-a-half for hours worked
in excess of forty-four.1 An employee was therefore required to work
fifty-four and one-half hours before he became entitled to any pay in
addition to the guaranteed weekly wage. Despite the Belo contract's
apparent non-conformity with statutory prescriptions, the Court
seemed to feel that contractual specification of an hourly rate of pay
together with the time-and-a-half provision for overtime was sufficient
ground for distinguishing the Missel case, where there were no such
provisions. Technical distinctions aside, however, motivation for the
exception created by the Belo case may well be traced to the desirabil-
ity of the guaranteed weekly wage for employees engaged in industries
where working-hours fluctuate from week to week and from day to day.
Subsequent decisions which have limited the Belo exception to wage
plans identical with those then under scrutiny would seem to confirm
this view.
12
10. 316 U.S. 624 (1942).
11. The maximum fixed by the statute at that time. The number of hours specified in
§ 7(a) was forty-four during the first year, forty-two during the second year and forty dur-
ing the third and subsequent years from and after October 24, 1938, the effective date of
the section.
12. The Belo exception was affirmed by the Court in Walling v. Halliburton Oil Well
Cementing Co., 331 U.S. 17 (1947) (employee worked more than eighty-four hours before
he became entitled to any pay in addition to the weekly guarantee). But its application
has been strictly limited to Belo-type wage plans. In Bay Ridge Operating Co. v. Aaron,
334 U.S. 446, 462, (1948), referring to the Belo case, the Court said: "Where the same
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Judicial adherence to the principles enunciated in the Missel case
has been steadfast except for the deviation permitted in the Belo and
identical situations. Contracts attempting in various ways to specify a
"regular rate" differing from that actually paid for the hours normally
or regularly worked have been invalidated without regard to the par-
ties' good faith in setting such rates.13 Illustrative of these contract-
specified wage plans were the ones considered by the Court in Walling
v. Helmerich & Payne.14 The individual employment contracts there
involved (which were designed to maintain the wage levels existing
prior to the Act) divided each daily shift of eight hours into two equal
parts: the hourly wage rate specified for the first four hours was labelled
the "base or regular rate," which, the contracts recited, should never
apply to over forty hours in any workweek. The remaining four hours
were then called "overtime" and, as such, were said to be subject to
time-and-a-half. This split-day plan was held to violate Section 7(a).
Its vice was that the contract "regular rate" did not represent the rate
actually paid for normal, non-overtime hours, nor was extra compensa-
tion provided for true overtime hours. The contract "overtime" rate
type of guaranteed weekly wages were involved, we have reaffirmed that decision as a
narrow precedent principally because of public reliance upon and congressional acceptance
of the rule there announced."
After the Belo decision there were many attempts to designate a regular rate, which
was not the actual rate paid, by contracts different from Belo-type agreements. Most of
these were discredited by the lower courts and were not reviewed by the Supreme Court.
They include: Watkins v. Hudson Coal Co., 151 F.2d 311 (3rd Cir. 1945) (agreements
whereby regular rate was to be found by dividing total compensation received by the hours
worked plus 1Y2 the hours worked in excess of forty) ; Walling v. Green Head Bit &
Supply Co., 138 F.2d 453 (10th Cir. 1943) (oral employment contracts which designated
a regular hourly rate subject to reduction, if the employee worked in excess of forty-two
hours, so that compensation for all hours worked would equal the reduced rate for the
first forty-two hours plus 1'/ times that reduced rate for excess hours) ; Walling v. Stone,
131 F.2d 461 (7th Cir. 1942) (agreements for a fixed weekly wage for fluctuating hours,
the parties having agreed that the fixed wage included compensation for overtime) ; Webb
v. Brady Transfer & Storage Co., 72 F.Supp. 170 (S.D. Ia. 1947) (arrangement providing
a "basic rate" for the first forty hours plus 1/ times that rate for twenty hours each week,
whether or not worked, but including no provision for additional pay in the event that
overtime hours actually exceeded twenty per week) ; Scott v. Atlas Press Co., 49 F.Supp.
260 (W.D.Mich. 1943) (agreement designating an hourly rate for straight-time hours, and
providing for deduction of 5% from total compensation due if the employee worked during
overtime hours). The courts have refused even to consider the validity of the contracts
when practice did not conform to the contractual provisions. 149 Madison Ave. Corp. v.
Asselta, 331 U.S. 199 (1947) ; McComb v. Sterling Ice & Cold Storage Co., 165 F.2d 265
(10th Cir. 1947) ; Walling v. United Distillers Products Corp., 63 F. Supp. 474 (D.Conn.
1945).
13. Walling v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 323 U.S. 37 (1944); Walling v. Younger-
man-Reynolds Hardwood Co., 325 U.S. 419 (1945); Walling v. Harnischfeger Corp,, 325
U.S. 427 (1945) ; Bay Ridge Operating Co. v. Aaron, 334 U.S. 446 (1948), all discussed
infra. See, also, 149 Madison Ave. Corp. v. Asselta, 331 U.S. 199 (1947).
14. 323 U.S. 37 (1944).
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was in reality a part of the "regular rate" because it was payment for a
portion of the normal work-day. 15
Another major area for interpretation of the "regular rate" concept
is that involving incentive earnings and piece-work rates. Such pay-
ments are part of the statutory regular rate when paid pursuant to an
agreed plan,' 6 or when paid so regularly that the employee-recipients
consider them part of their regular compensation, rather than a gratu-
ity.'7 It is immaterial that the wage depends upon market-place con-
tingencies and therefore cannot be determined until after the work
week.' Of course, the fact that such payments have been treated as
15. In the Bay Ridge case, the Court was careful to note that it did not disturb its
decision in the Heherich & Payne case-which it dismissed as involving a "palpable
evasion of the statutory purposes." 334 U.S. 446, 466 (1948). The rule of the Helmerieh
& Payne decision was applied by lower courts in invalidating other plans under which an
employer sought to split the actual workweek or workday into straight-time and overtime
segments. In Robertson v. Alaska Juneau Gold Mining Co., 157 F2d 876 (9th Cir. 1946),
cert. denied, 331 U.S. 823 (1947), the court struck down a plan under which the first seven
hours of a regular eight-hour daily shift were designated as "straight-time" and the last
hour of the shift as "overtime." Walling v. Alaska Pacific Consolidated Mining Co., 152
F. 2d 812 (9th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 803 (1946), involved a plan which split
the regular eight-hour daily shift into six "straight-time" hours and two "overtime" hours.
Splitting of the workweek was disapproved in Walling v. Arctic Circle Exploration, Inc.,
56 F.Supp. 944 (W.D. Wash. 1944), in which the employer adopted the practice of desig-
nating the first hour of the week as straight-time and all subsequent hours as overtime.
16. Walling v. Wall Wire Products Co., 161 F.2d 470 (6th Cir. 1947), cert. denicd,
331 U.S. 828 (1947) (monthly and year-end bonuses based on straight-time hours
worked) ; Carlton Screw Products Co. v. Fleming, 126 F.2d 537 (Sth Cir. 1942), cert.
denied, 317 U.S. 634 (1942) ("bonus or gratuity" amounting to the difference betveen the
employee's weekly compensation at new hourly rates and his old weekly wage).
17. McComb v. Shepherd Niles Crane and Hoist Corp., S WH CAsEs 34, 15 LAnoa
CASES f 64,851 (2nd Cir. Dec. 1, 1948) (quarterly "prosperity" bonuses) ; Bibb fg. Co.
v. Walling, 164 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, sub nora., Bibb Mffg. Co. v. Mc-
Comb, 333 U.S. 836 (1948) (attendance bonuses) ; Walling v. Garlock Packing Co., 159
F.2d 44 (2nd Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 820 (1947) (payments equal to the divi-
dends payable on shares of stock varying in number according to the length of service) ;
Walling v. Richmond Screw Anchor Co., 154 F.2d 780 (2nd Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 328
U.S. 70 (1946) (production bonuses based on a percentage of the employee's straight-
time earnings).
18. Walling v. Wall Wire Products Co., note 16 supra. On the other hand, bonus and
profit-sharing payments paid as a gratuity in the discretion of the employer at irregular
times and not in accordance with an agreed plan are not part of the "regular rate." Wal-
ling v. Frank Adam Electric Co., 163 F.2d 277 (8th Cir. 1947) (bonus based on a per-
centage of each employee's straight-time earnings). See also Roland Electrical Co. v.
Black, 163 F.2d 417 (4th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 854 (1948) (year-end bonuses
based on a percentage of each employee's gross earnings). In De Waters v. Macklin Co.,
167 F2d 694 (6th Cir. 1948), cert. denicd, 69 S.Ct. 48 (1948), monthly bonuses based upon
the employee's total earnings, including overtime, were held allocable as between regular
rate and overtime, and, so allocated, satisfied the requirements of § 7(a). These statements
are in accord with the interpretations of the Administrator. 3 CCH LAD. LAW RIX'.
(Vages and Hours) 11 25,520 (.65 to .786, inclusive), 29,003 (1948), 1944-1945 WH MANu.
167, 1502; 1947 WH MAN. 65. Until June 1947 it had been the Administrator's enforce-
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wages for workmen's compensation, unemployment compensation,
social security and income tax purposes has been persuasive.19
Two leading cases dealing with incentive earnings illustrate these
generalized propositions. In the Youngerman-Reynolds case,20 the wage
contracts guaranteed that work would be paid for at not less than
fixed piece-work rates-in addition to a guaranteed "basic or regular"
hourly rate. Under the piece-work rates, however, employees normally
earned substantially more than under the so-called "regular rate." As
a result, the Court held the latter rate inapplicable for overtime pay
purposes, asserting that:
"The regular rate by its very nature must reflect all payments
which the parties have agreed shall be received regularly during
the work week, exclusive of overtime payments. It is not an arbi-
trary label chosen by the parties; it is an actual fact. Once the
parties have decided upon the amount of wages and the mode of
payment the determination of the regular rate becomes a matter of
mathematical computation, the result of which is unaffected by any
designation of a contrary 'regular rate' in the wage contracts." 21
A similar view was expressed in the Harnischfeger case.22 There, about
98.5% of the employees doing certain incentive work earned wages in
addition to the hourly rate fixed by a collective bargaining agreement.
Such incentive bonuses constituted 22% of their total compensation,
exclusive of overtime payments. In those instances when an incentive
worker was temporarily assigned to non-incentive work, he was paid
at least 20% more than the illusory basic hourly rate. However, when
incentive employees worked more than the statutory maximum, they
received only a premium of 50% of the basic rate. 23 Once again, the
Court found solution of the problem simple: since the incentive bonuses
were regularly earned, they were to be added to the basic rate; together,
these comprised the statutory regular rate. In addition, the higher
hourly rate received by incentive workers for non-incentive work was
the regular rate for such work-since, quite obviously, it was the rate
normally paid. 
9
ment policy not to require inclusion in the regular rate of any payments distributed less
frequently than quarterly. 1944-1945 WH MAN. 1502. This enforcement policy was with-
drawn by an order of the Administrator. 12 FEP. REG. 3915 (1947). See 3 CCI-I LAu, LAW
REP. (Wages and Hours) 125,520 (.77) (1948). WH MAN. 50:439, note, 50:470, note.
19. See McComb v. Shepherd Niles Crane & Hoist Corp., Walling v. Richmond Screw
Anchor Co., note 17 supra.
20. 325 U.S. 419 (1945). The Court had already held that wage payments on a piece-
work basis must be translated into an hourly rate and must meet the requirements of
§ 7(a). U.S. v. Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. 360 (1945).
21. 325 U.S. 419, 424-5 (1945).
22. 325 U.S. 427 (1945).
23. Vacation pay was also based on the incentive employee's average hourly straight-
time earnings over a three month period, not on his basic rate.
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The clear line of decision, having its origin in the Missel case and
incorporated into the official interpretations of the Wage and Hour
Division,24 keyed "regular rate" under section 7(a) to the regularity or
normalcy of the employment. Thus, the converse became a criterion
of true overtime pay: if a rate was paid for time only occasionally
worked-i.e., not normally or regularly worked-then it could quite
easily be labeled an overtime rate. 21 Within the scope of this rule were
drawn such diverse payments, among others, as those made for work
(1) on Saturdays, Sundays and holidays, (2) before or after stated
hours, (3) for work outside of an employee's regular shift. 3 In con-
trast, a higher rate of pay for undesirable hours or for dirty or dan-
gerous work-although a premium payment-was in reality the regular
rate for such work and therefore to be included in the statutory regular
rate.
2 7
Wage practices in a very substantial portion of industry were the
outgrowth of reliance upon the above-outlined guides to "regular rate"
determination. It was, therefore, not surprising that the Bay Ridge
case, with its revamping of overtime pay criteria, should have effects
reminiscent of the portal-to-portal pay controversy.
THE BAY RIDGE CASE
Employment in the longshore industry has always been casual and
sporadic. Its complete dependence upon the number of ships in port
24. Interpretative Bulletin No. 4, I1f 69, 70, 3 CCH LaD. LAw RrE,. (Wages and
Hours) J24, 478 (1948), 1944-1945 WH MAx. 167-172; rescinded to the extent that these
paragraphs are inconsistent with the Bay Ridge case, Wage and Hour Division Release
PR 161, note 46 infra; Opinion Letters of the Wage and Hour Division, 3 CCH LAP. Lrv
REP. (Wages and Hours) ff 25,520 (.26, .272, .562, .563), 25,540 (A6, .565, .53, .651) (1948),
1944-1945 WH M L~x. 225,226 (daily overtime) ; id. at 226-7 (premium pay under union con-
tracts) ; id. at 227 (offsetting premium rates) ; 1947 WH MX . 65 (crediting night shift
pay toward overtime due) ; id. at 69 (crediting premium pay under union contracts against
overtime compensation); id. at 83 (night-work bonus); id. at 91 (night-vwork overtime
rate).
25. This test had apparently been accepted by the Administrator in his Interpretative
Bulletin No. 4, ff 69, 3 CCH LAB. LAW REP. (Wages and Hours) ff24, 473 (1948), 1944-
1945 WH MA.x. 167, which provides: ". . . in determining whether he has met the over-
time requirements of Section 7 the employer may properly consider as overtime compensa-
tion paid by him, for the purpose of satisfying these requirements, only the extra amount
of compensation--over and above straight time-paid by him as compensalior, for ozcrtimc
work-that is, for hours worked outside the normal or regular working hours-regardless
of whether he is required to pay such compensation by a union or other agreement." Para-
graph 69 has been rescinded by the Administrator to the extent that it is inconsistent vith
the Bay Ridge decision. Wage and Hour Division Release PR 161, note 46 infra.
26. For indication of the practice in industry generally, see the surveys cited in notes
42 and 43 infra; for practice in the longshore industry see Findings of Fact Nos. 14, 19, Z0
by the District Court in the Bay Ridge case set forth in the appendix to the opinion of the
Circuit Court of Appeals, 162 F.2d 665, 670-2 (2d Cir. 1947).
27. Cabunac v. National Terminals Corp., 139 F2d 853 (7th Cir. 1944); Ferrer v.
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at any given time and the length of their stay have caused the amount
of work available to vary from day to day, week to week and season to
season. In an attempt to compress the work into normal daytime hours,
both labor and management agreed, as long ago as 1887, that the rate
for night and holiday work should be higher than the day rate.2" And
since 1916, collective bargaining agreements between employers and
the International Longshoremen's Association have consistently in-
cluded a differential of 50%.
When the Fair Labor Standards Act was enacted, the parties re-
phrased their agreement in an attempt to satisfy its requirements.
Thus, when some longshoremen defied their union heads and sued
their employers in the Bay Ridge case, 29 the controverted provision of
the collective bargaining agreement drawn into question read:
"(a) Straight time rate shall be paid for any work performed
from 8 A.M. to 12 Noon and from 1 P.M. to 5 P.M., Monday to Fri-
day inclusive, and from 8 A.M. to 12 Noon Saturday. (b) All other
time, including meal hours and the Legal Holidays specified herein,
shall be considered overtime and shall be paid for at the overtime
rate." ?0
The issue was sharply drawn: did the "straight-time rate" specified
in the agreement constitute the statutory "regular rate" of section 7 (a)?
The trial court, strongly influenced by the fact that the rates were the
outcome of the collective bargaining process in an unusual industry,
answered in'the affirmative, thereby holding, as a corollary, that the
contract overtime rates were true overtime. 31 Upon appeal, the Circuit
Court reversed, holding that the contract overtime rates were to be
included in computing "regular rate" since the hours involved, al-
though casual and sporadic, were part of the normal workday of the
longshoreman.
32
Waterman S. S. Corp., 70 F.Supp. 1 (D. Puerto Rico 1947) ; sce Roland Electrical Co. v.
Black, 163 F.2d 417 (4th Cir. 1947) cert. denied, 333 U.S. 854 (1948).
28. 162 F.2d 665, 670-2 (2d Cir. 1947).
29. The section was defended by the United States Department of Justice because of
ultimate liability of the Government for any amounts recovered under wartime cost-plus
contracts. The suit was opposed by the International Longshoremen's Association, whose
president testified as a witness for the employers.
30. 334 U.S. 446, 452 (1948).
31. Addison v. Huron Stevedoring Corp., 69 F. Supp. 956 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
32. Aaron v. Bay Ridge Operating Co., 162 F.2d 665 (2d Cir. 1947). Although the
Wage and Hour Administrator took no formal position during the trial of the Bay Ridge
case, he later expressed his views as in accord with the Circuit Court. Thus, the De-
partment of Justice in its petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court stated that the Ad-
ministrator "believes that proper consideration was given by the court below [Circuit
Court]to his interpretations of Section 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act and that the
decision below is correct." Daily Labor Report No. 193, F-1, F-10 (1947). The highly
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Confronted with antithetical reasoning by the lower courts, the
Supreme Court traced its own path out of the maze. 33 It saw the cen-
tral problem as one of sifting out the true overtime premiums from the
ordinary wage payments, since "to permit overtime premium to enter
into the computation of the regular rate would be to allow overtime
premium on overtime premium-a pyramiding that Congress could
not have intended." 34 The Court then proceeded to define "overtime
premium" as "extra pay for work because of previous work for a
specified number of hours in the workweek or workday whether the
hours are specified by contract or statute." -1 Obviously, the "over-
time" rate stipulated in the collective bargaining agreement did not
satisfy this definition because it did not depend for its application
upon any previous work at all. The mere fact of work within the con-
tract overtime hours entitled the employee to premium pay.
As guides for the future, the Court pointed out that neither statutory
excess compensation paid for work in excess of forty hours, nor similar
contract excess compensation for work in excess of prior work should
be used in calculating statutory regular rate. Such extra pay by con-
tract because of longer hours than the standard fixed by the contract
for the day or week was said to have the same purpose as statutory
excess compensation and must likewise be excluded.-" Taking issue
with the District Court, which had held that the 50% premium was
the earmark of true overtime, rather than of a shift differential, the
informal nature of this opinion to the Department of Justice was later indicated, but the
position taken was affirmed by the Administrator. Hearings before Subcommittce No. 4 of
the Committee on Edtcation and Labor, House of Rctresentati'es, on Proposcd Amend-
ments of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 193S, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 236S-71, 2591 2734-7,
(1947).
33. Bay Ridge Operating Co. v. Aaron, 334 U.S. 446 (194S). The Supreme Court
affirmed the Circuit Court but based its conclusion upon different reasons.
34. Id. at 464.
35. Id. at 450 n. 3. "The higher rate must be paid because of the hours previously
worked for the extra pay to be an overtime premium." Id. at 466. The Court repeated its
rule that, where there are no overtime premium payments, statutory regular rate is de-
termined by dividing the wages actually paid by the hours actually worked in any work
week. It declared that any overtime premium included in the weekly pay check must be
deducted before the division.
36. The Court was careful to note that the holding in Walling v. Helmerich & Payne
"is not contrary to this position." 334 U.S. 446, 466 n. 22 (194S). This may indicate the
result that a premium rate actually paid for hours fewer than eight per day or forty per
week is part of the regular rate when such hours are regularly or normally worked. Cf.
Robertson et al. v. Alaska Juneau Gold Mining Co., 157 F2d 376 (9th Cir. 1946) and
Walling v. Alaska Pacific Consolidated Mining Co., 152 F.2d 812 (9th Cir. 1945). See
discussion note 15 supra. The Court's omission of any reference to regularity in defining
overtime premium and its statement that "this case presents no problems that involve de-
termination of the regular hours of work" (334 U.S. 446, 473 (1948)) can he reconciled
with that result on the ground that the sporadic nature of employment in the Bay Ridge
case made any regularity test inapplicable to the contract before the Court.
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Supreme Court contended that "a mere higher rate paid as a job
differential or as a shift differential, or for Sunday or holiday work,"
is not an overtime premium. Nor is it material in determining the
character of the extra pay that an employee actually has worked at a
lower rate earlier in the worknveek prior to the receipt of the higher rate.
Examples of the proper application of these principles were given
by the Court: 37
"(1) The employment contract calls for an overtime premium for
work beyond thirty-six hours. Such extra pay should not be in-
cluded as weekly wages in any computation of the regular rate at
which a man works." 3a
"(2) A contract provides for payment of time and a half for work
in excess of eight hours in a single workday. An employee who
works five ten-hour days would have no claim for statutory excess
compensation if paid the amount due by the contract." 11
"(3) A contract provides for a rate of $1 an hour for the first 40
hours and $1.50 for all excess hours; an employee works 48 hours
and receives $52. To find his regular rate of pay, the overtime
premium of $4 should be deducted and the resulting sum divided
by 48 hours.4" On the other hand, a man might be employed as a
37. 334 U.S. 446, 467-8 (1948). The Court's footnotes are omitted.
38. The Court does not state whether thirty-six hours is the normal or regular work-
week. It would seem, however, that this example must be predicated on the fact that the
employee regularly or normally works a thirty-six hour week and no longer. If the em-
ployee regularly or normally worked, for example, more than forty hours, the premium
rate paid for the four hours regularly worked between thirty-six and forty hours per week
would seem to be part of the regular rate under Walling v. Helinerich & Payne. 323 U.S.
37 (1944).
39. Hours in excess of eight a day have been generally regarded as true overtime even
though the employee regularly works a longer day. See notes 42 and 43 infra. This is
consistent with practice under the Walsh-Healey Act, 49 STAT. 2036 (1936), as amended,
41 U.S.C. §35-45 (Supp. 1946), which requires that premium pay for hours in excess of
eight in any one day be paid employees of those contractors who furnish equipment to the
Government valued in excess of $10,000. Since the Bay Ridge decision, the Administrator
has approved such practice if premium pay after eight hours is required by federal or state
law, or eight hours is the employee's regular or normal work day, Opinion Letter, Acting
Administrator, 22 BNA LA. RE.. REP. (Wages and Hours) 1399 (1948) ; 3 CCH L".
LAv REP. (Wages and Hours) ff 29,006 (1948). There has, however, been no decision or
authoritative ruling that such payments may be treated as true overtime when not required
by federal or state law and a longer day is regularly or normally worked. A contrary view
had been expressed prior to the Bay Ridge case in an opinion letter issued by the Wage
and Hour Division, 1944-1945 WH MAN. 225, 226. The Act at present requires premium
pay only for work in excess of forty hours. Undoubtedly, the legislators were thinking in
terms of five eight-hour days. The Act should, however, be clarified to make such result
explicit.
40. This is in refutation of the statement of the District Court in the Bay Ridgc case
that a logical extension of a decision for plaintiffs would require that premium pay for
hours regularly worked in excess of forty be included in the computation of regular rate.
Addison v. Huron Stevedoring Corp., 69 Fed. Supp. 956,958-9 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
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night watchman on an eight-hour shift at time and a half the wage
rate of day watchmen. This would be extra pay for undesirable
hours. It is a shift differential. It would not be overtime premium
pay but would be included in the computation for determining
overtime premium for any excess hours."
Three justices dissented, strongly urging that the Act should not be
construed to prevent the parties to a collective bargaining agreement,
dealing at arms length, from establishing a regular rate which honestly
reflects industrial conditions. This faith in the collective bargaining
process was soon to be reflected in some of the legislative attempts to
remedy the problems raised by the Bay Ridge case.
The decision of the majority can hardly be criticized from the stand-
point of the semantics involved. The Act itself is worded in terms of
extra compensation for hours in excess of the statutory standard; the
very word "overtime" implies excessiveness. Indeed, had this "doc-
trinaire approach" been enunciated ten years earlier, it might have
materially assisted in the development of the administration of the
Act. But despite the Bay Ridge decision's apparent semantic soundness
and its adherence to the statutory purposes of spreading employment
and of compensating employees for the burden of a long work week,41
it nevertheless requires an important departure from a long established
body of administrative interpretations which had ample support in
judicial precedent and which was reflected in a considerable proportion
of industrial overtime pay practices. Thus, premium payments had
been made for work on certain days of the week or hours of the day
without regard to whether such work was performed in excess of prior
work; and such payments had generally been regarded as true overtime
premium payments for purposes of the Act.
The extent to which pre-Bay Ridge wage practice differed from the
standard enunciated by the Supreme Court is indicated by a 1947
survey of collective bargaining contracts.4 - Of 437 agreements cover-
ing over 2 million employees, almost 50% specified premium pay for
Saturday work; 60% for Sunday work; and 80% for holiday work.
Frequently, double-time (an extra day's pay in addition to the straight-
time rate) was required for Sunday and holiday work. Many contracts
contained agreements like the one in the Bay Ridge case, requiring
41. See Overnight Motor Transportation Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 577-3 (1942);
Walling v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 323 U.S. 37, 40 (1944) ; Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v.
Local No. 6167, 325 U.S. 161, 167 (1945) ; Walling v. Youngerman-Re nolds Hardwood
Co., 325 U.S. 419, 423-4 (1945) ; Bay Ridge Operating Co. v. Aaron, 334 U.S. 446, 460
(1948).
42. Premium Pay Provisions in Selected Union Agrcements, MoNTrmY LAro, RD:In,
419 (Oct. 1947). This study covered over two million workers in thirty-one manufactur-
ing and non-manufacturing industries. The agreements in question were in effect in the
latter half of 1946.
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premium pay for hours worked outside of a designated clock pattern.
Others required a premium rate for work outside of an employee's
regular shift. And in a considerable number of agreements, provision
was made for premium pay after a specified number of hours fewer
than eight per day or forty per week-despite the fact that the em-
ployees regularly worked more than the number of daily or weekly
hours specified in such agreements. Other more recent surveys of labor
contracts confirm the widespread use of premium pay provisions such
as those described above. 
43
Wage payments pursuant to all such contract provisions must be
examined and tested by the rule of the Bay Ridge case. Are such extra
payments true overtime premiums? If not, can such provisions be
revised to permit employees to retain their benefits without subjecting
the employer to increased labor costs-resulting from such premium
payments being made part of the employee's "regular rate"?
Although such overtime pay practices fall within the scope of Bay
Ridge, employers who used them may, nevertheless, escape retroactive
liability. Under the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, defenses to actions
under the Fair Labor Standards Act are granted those employers who
fixed their wage payment practices in good faith-in conformity with
and in reliance on any written regulation, order, ruling, approval or
interpretation of the Wage and Hour Administrator with respect to
the class of employers to which an employer belongs. 44 Since most of
these practices were based upon prior official interpretations of the
Wage and Hour Administrator, the danger that employers will be
43. Basic Patterns in Collective Bargaining Contracts, BNA COLLEcTIVE BARGAININO
NEGOTIATIONS AND CONTRACTS SEnvIcE p. 15:25. This survey analyzes over 1,800 typical
contracts executed between September 1947 and July 1948. See also report of survey con-
ducted by committee of employer associations representing 5,055 employers in all branches
of industry, reported in Daily Labor Report No. 21,6, B-1 (1948), 22 BNA LAB. REL. Rrx.
(Wages and Hours) 1481 (1948).
44. 61 STAT. 84 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 216, 251-62, (Supp. 1948). Section 10 of the
Act operates prospectively to afford a "good faith" defense. The constitutionality of §§ 9
and 11 of the Act, which operate retroactively to permit a "good faith" defense to causes
of action which accrued prior to the effective date of the Act, have been upheld by three
circuit courts of appeal. Day & Zimmerman, Inc. v. Reid, 168 F.2d 356 (8th Cir. 1948);
Rogers Cartage Co. v. Reynolds, 166 F.2d 317 (6th Cir. 1948); Darr v. Mutual Life In-
surance Company of New York, 169 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1948), cert. denied, November 22,
1948. See Lasater v. Hercules Powder Co., 8 WH CASES 417, 15 LALOR CASMS 64,857
(6th Cir. 1948). The constitutionality of § 2 of the Portal-to-Portal Act, 61 STAr. 84, § 2;
29 U.S.C.A. § 252 (1947), which operates retroactively to bar claims not based on custom
and practice has been upheld in Atallah v. B. H. Hubbert & Son, 168 F. 2d 993 (4th Cir.
1948) cert. denied, November 15, 1948; Seese v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 168 F.2d 58 (4th
Cir. 1948) ; Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1948) cert. denied,
Dec. 6, 1948; Bateman v. Ford Motor Co., 169 F. 2d 266 (6th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, Jan,
3, 1949.
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retroactively liable as a result of the new judicial interpretation is sub-
stantially eliminated.
45
A similar situation exists in regard to possible future liability of
employers who fix wage payment practices in good faith relying upon
new interpretations of the administrator in which he has sought to
apply the rule of the Bay Ridge case.
VAGE AND HouR ADMINISTIPTOR's APPLICATION
OF THE BAY RIDGE RTrULE
Within a month of the decision in the Bay Ridge case, the Wage and
Hour Administrator responded to employer pleas for guidance in
interpreting and revising employment contracts to accord with the new
criteria. In a statement of general principles,-' followed by opinion
letters directed to specific problems, the Administrator sought to salve
the impact of novelty.
The most important factors which run through the Administrator's
opinion letters are (1) his willingness to find that premium payments
are paid for time in excess of a bona fide standard in circumstances
where, without the Administrator's insight, the standard is not readily
apparent and (2) his acceptance of the pattern of employment of a
particular plant or of a group within a plant as indicative of the regular
or normal employment pattern of individual employees within such
plant or group. Keeping in mind these factors, the Administrator's
pronouncements present the following results with respect to specific
wage payment practices.
Premium Pay for Work in Excess of a Bona Fide Standard
Premium pay for work in excess of a specified number of hours or
days established as a bona fide daily or weekly standard is a true over-
time premium; such pay need not be included in the computation of
the statutory regular rate and may be offset against the overtime
45. The Bay Ridge case, itself, and several other cases involving the longshore indus-
try are presently being prepared for trial on the "good faith defense" issue.
46. Wage and Hour Division Release PR 161, July 11, 1948; 3 CCH L=tn LA, R P.
(Wages and Hours) 29,006 (1948); WH MAx. 50:646. This statement amplified the
principles previously announced by the Administrator in Wage and Hour Division Release
PR 153, June 11, 1948; 3 CCH LA.. LAw REP. (Wages and Hours) 1129,004 (1948);
"WH -MAN. 50:645. The interpretations announced in PR 161, Supra, were codified and
published as Title 29, Labor, c. V, sub. c. B, pt. 778, §§ 778.1-.3 of the Code of Federal
Regulations, 13 FED. REG. 4534, 4535 (Aug. 6, 1948), 3 CCH LAB. LAW REP. (Wages and
Hours) 24,104; WH MAN. 50:647.
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compensation required by statute. 47 The normal pattern of the plant
or group, not of the individual employee, is the criterion for determin-
ing whether a premium rate is paid for time in excess of a bona fide
standard.48 Such a pattern is not affected by occasional absences be-
cause of recognized holidays,.illness or other excuses which accord with
a bona fide plant practice; 41 nor is it affected by infrequent or tem-
porary plant shutdowns of short duration."
Even though an employer follows a regular practice of operating
on a workweek longer than forty hours, premium pay for hours in ex-
cess of forty constitutes statutory overtime compensation. 1 And the
same is true when premiums are paid in conformity with federal or
state laws for hours in excess of eight daily, despite the fact that the
employer frequently operates on a schedule of more than eight hours
a day.5
2
Premium pay for work on the sixth and seventh consecutive days of
the workweek also falls within the true overtime conpensation cate-
gory.5
3
47. Wage and Hour Division Release PR 161, note 46, supra. See also 3 CCH LAI.
LAW REP. (Wages and Hours) Iff 29,007, 29,011, 29,026, 29,028, 29,031 (1948), 22 BNA
LAB. RF.T. RaP. (Wages and Hours) 1313, 1339, 1373, 1394, 1397 (1948). However, il
Wage and Hour Division Release PR 161, supra, the Administrator declared: "In situa-
tions where the normal or regular working hours are artificially divided into a 'straight-
time' period . . . followed by an 'overtime' period . . . the so-called 'straight-time' period
will not be regarded as the bona fide standard working period of the employee . . ." citing
Walling v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 323 U.S. 37 (1944) and Robertson v. Alaska Juneau
Gold Mining Co., 157 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1946) cert. denied, 331 U.S. 823 (1947), discussed
note 15 supra.
48. 3 CCH LAB. LAW REP. (Wages and Hours) 111 29,012, 29,026, 29,027, 29,028, 29,-
030, 29,031, 29,036 (1948), 22 BNA LAD. RPa.. REP. (Wages and Hours) 1341, 1373, 1392,
1394, 1395, 1397, 1389 (1948). If the employment is covered by a master contract for an in-
dustry, the practice of a particular employer, not the whole group of employers, will deter-
mine the practice with respect to his employees or any distinguishable group thereof, 3
CCH LAB. LAW RaP. (Wages and Hours) 1129,026 (1948), 22 BNA LAB. REL. REa,.
(Wages and Hours) 1373 (1948).
49. 3 CCH LAB. LAW REP. (Wages and Hours) 111 29,027, 29,028, 29,030, 29,031
(1948), 22 BNA LAB. Rm. REP. (Wages and Hours) 1392, 1394, 1395, 1397 (1948).
50. 3 CCH LAB. LAw REP. (Wages and Hours) 1 29,028 (1948), 22 BNA LAD. RX,,
RPp. (Wages and Hours) 1394 (1948). See also 3 CCH LA%, LAW RaP. (Wages and
Hours) f129,029 (1948), 22 BNA LAB. REL. RaP. (Wages and Hours) 1395 (1948).
51. 3 CCH LAB. LAw REP. (Wages and Hours) ff 29,032 (1948), 22 BNA L,, Rar.
RaP. (Wages and Hours) 1399 (1948).
52. Ibid.
53. Wage and Hour Division Release PR 161, note 46 supra. See also 3 CCI-I LAD.
LAW REP. (Wages and Hours) 129,031 (1948), 22 BNA LAD. RE. REp. (Wages and
Hours) 1397 (1948). The Supreme Court defined overtime premium as extra pay for
work in excess of a specified number of hours in the workveek or workday. This caused
speculation as to whether the definition excluded extra pay for work in excess of a spe-
cified number of days in the workweek. See, e.g., Brief of American Federation of Labor,
as amicus curiae, in support of motion for rehearing in the Bay Ridge ease, Daily Labor
Report No. 193, D-1 (1948).
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Holiday Pay
Premium pay for work on certain holidays designated by contract
or practice (e.g., New Year's or Christmas) is part of the employee's
regular rate since the payment is not contingent upon the employee's
having previously worked a specified number of hours or days within
theweek.
54
If straight-time pay is received for an idle holiday, such payment is
not part of the employee's regular rate since it is paid for time not
worked; conversely, since it is not paid for time in excess of a bona fide
standard, such pay may not be credited toward statutory required
overtime compensation. 5 But when the employee receives straight-
time pay for work on the holiday and in addition, the straight-time pay
due for the idle holiday, (a total of double time), the result is different:
the idle holiday pay may be excluded from the employee's regular rate
while the straight-time pay for the holiday work must be included in
the regular rate.5 6 If the employee receives less than double time for
work on a holiday, the whole payment received is part of the regular
rate, despite the fact that had he not worked at all, he would have
received straight-time pay. Y
In the case of work performed on that part of a regular shift which
cuts into a scheduled day-off, the premium pay is not true overtime
unless that portion of the day for which the premium is paid normally
falls during overtime hours."S
54. 3 CCH LAB. LAw REP. (Wages and Hours) 1f 29,011, 29,014, 29,026, 29,027, 29,-
031, 29,033,, 29,040 (1948), 22 BNA LAB. Rm. REP. (Wages and Hours) 1339, 1343, 1373,
1392, 1397, 1405 (1948). 23 BNA LAB REL. REP. (Wages and Hours) 1479 (1943).
55. 3 CCH LAB. LAW REP. (Wages and Hours) 1129,011, 29,026, 29,027 (194S), 22
BNA LAB. Pn. REP. (Wages and Hours) 1339, 1373, 1392 (1948). See also Wage and
Hour Division Release PR 161, note 46 mspra, wherein the Administrator declared that
the principles announced in the Bay Ridge case do not relate to payments that are made
for hours not worked, such as payments made to employees for idle holidays or for oc-
casional absences due to vacation or illness or other similar causes, and that such pay-
ments may be excluded from the computation of an employee's regular rate; they cannot
be credited toward statutory required overtime compensation. This is in accord vith past
interpretations. Interpretative Bulletin No. 4, 170(7), (S), 3 CCH LAD. LA,, REP.
(Wages and Hours) 124,478 (1948), 1944-1945 WH Mfz. 170, 171. Opinion Letters of
Wage and Hour Division, 3 CCII LAB. LAW REP. (Wages and Hours) 25,520 (MO to
.64) (1948), 1944-1945 WH Msar. 18, 232, 1504, and 1947 WH MfAz. 57, 93.
56. 3 CCH LAB. LAw REP. (Wages and Hours) tff 29,026, 29,027 (194S), 22 BNA
LAB. PR. REP. (Wages and Hours) 1373, 1392 (1948).
57. This opinion is predicated on the proposition that if a portion of the holiday pay
equal to straight-time were regarded as pay for an idle holiday, it would lead to the
unrealistic assumption that work performed on the holiday was being compensated at
less than the straight-time rate. 22 BNA LAB. Rr. REP. (Wages and Hours) 1418
(1948).
58. 3 CCH LAB. LAW R.P. (Wages and Hours) 1129,027 (1948), 22 BNA Ltx. REL.
REP. (Wages and Hours) 1392 (1948).
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Weekend Premiums
Premium pay for Saturdays and Sundays is part of the regular rate
of pay,59 unless the time worked on those days is normally in excess of
a bona fide standard; in the latter case, such premium pay may be
regarded as true overtime conpensation ° In determining whether
Saturday and Sunday work does exceed a bona fide standard, the
Division will look not only at the terms of the applicable contract,
but also at the actual practice of the parties under the contract," If
such work is normally in excess of a bona fide standard, the fact that in-
dividual employees may receive premium payments without necessarily
having worked the number of hours or days in that standard (because
of occasional illness or other bona fide excused absence) does not pre-
vent the Saturday and Sunday pay from being true overtime.02 For
example, when a regular or normal workweek of five eight hour days
starts on Monday, the Saturday and Sunday work will normally fall
within excess hours and therefore, premium pay for Saturday and
Sunday work can be considered true overtime compensation.3 If,
however, the workweek starts on any other day, premium pay for
work on Saturday and Sunday is part of the regular rate since it is not
paid for work in excess of a bona fide standard."
But when the employment pattern is actually so casual or sporadic
that Saturday and Sunday work does not normally fall within over-
time hours, premiums paid for work on those days are part of the
59. 3 CCH LAB. LAW REP. (Wages and Hours) 11129,012, 29,014 (1948), 22 BNA
LAB. R.. REP. (Wages and Hours) 1341, 1343 (1948).
60. Wage and Hour Division Release PR 161, note 46 supra. 3 CCH LAB. LAW REP.
(Wages and Hours) 11129,011, 29,012, 29,013, 29,026, 29,028, 29,030, 29,032, 29,036 (1948),
22 BNA LAB. RE. REP. (Wages and Hours) 1339, 1340, 1341, 1373, 1389, 1394, 1395, 1399
(1948).
61. Wage and Hour Division Release PR 161, note 46 supra. The actual practice
of the parties may override the terms of the contract itself in determining the overtime
status of the premium pay. For example, if a collective bargaining agreement requires
premium pay for work on Saturdays and Sundays, as such, but contains no provision
requiring premium pay for work in excess of a bona fide standard, premiums paid for
Saturday and Sunday may be true overtime compensation if, in actual practice, such
premiums are paid for work in excess of a bona fide standard. 3 CCH LAB. LAW Rm,
(Wages and Hours) 11129,012, 29,040 (1948), 22 BNA LAB. REL. REP, (Wages and
Hours) 1341 (1948), 23 BNA LAB. REL. REP. (Wages and Hours) 1479 (1948). The
start of the workweek designated in payroll records must coincide with that designated in
the contract of employment. 3 CCH LAB. LAW RaP. (Wages and Hours) % 29,032 (1948),
22 BNA LAB. REL. RaP. (Wages and Hours) 1399 (1948).
62. See note 49 supra.
63. 3 CCH LAB. LAW RaP. (Wages and Hours) 11129,011, 29,030, 29,031 (1948), 22
BNA LAB. REL. RE'. (Wages and Hours) 1339, 1395, 1397 (1948).
64. 3 CCH LAB. LAW REp. (Wages and Hours) 1129,014 (1948), 22 BNA LAn. REL,
REP. (Wages and Hours) 1343 (1948). This ruling particularly affects cases in which
plant operations necessitate a staggered workweek so that some employees begin their
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regular rate--despite a designation as overtime in the applicable em-
ployment contract.6 5
Pre-shift and Post-shift Work
In those situations where premiums are paid for work performed
before the start of an employee's regular shift (without regard to the
employee's having previously worked a specified number of hours
according to a bona fide standard) the payments do not fall within the
true overtime compensation category."
However, if the employee's normal work day is designated as a
specified number of hours in a twenty-four hour period, overtime pay
for such pre-shift hours may be true overtime compensation-if the
employee normally or regularly works a specified number of hours within
the twenty-four hour period in which the pre-shift time falls., For
example, a contract designates twenty-four consecutive hours, beginning
8 A.M., as the work day and schedules a regular shift of eight hours to
start at that time. The employee is called in to work at 6 A.M.,-two
hours before the start of his regular shift. Since these two hours are
in excess of the eight hours regularly scheduled during the preceding
work day of twenty-four consecutive hours, premium pay for such
hours may be treated as true overtime."
Premium payments for work after hours designated as the regular
shift may be treated as true overtime if the designated regular shift
corresponds to the normal employment pattern of the plant or group;
occasional deviations by individual employees from the group work
pattern do not affect the general criterion.c9
Work at Different Rates of Pay
Where an employee, during the same week, performs work for which
different rates are paid, the regular rate of the employee is the weighted
average of the rates received during the week.
70
workweek on other days of the calendar week. See statement 22 BNA LAD. Rrj Prp.
(Wages and Hours) 1362 (1948).
65. 3 CCH LAB. LAW REP. (Wages and Hours) 11129,026, 29,030 (1943), 22 B:A
LAB. REL- REP. (Wages and Hours) 1373, 1395 (1948).
66. 3 CCH LAB. LAW Ran. (Wages and Hours) 1129,026, Example III (1943), 13
BNA LAB. Rnr. REP. (Wages and Hours) 1373, Example III (1948).
67. 3 CCH LAB. LAW REP. (Wages and Hours) 1129,026, Example III, 29,027
(1948), 22 BNA LAB. REL. REP. (Wages and Hours) 1373, Example III, 1392 (1943).
6S. 3 CCH LAB. LAW REP. (Wages and Hours) 129,027 (1943), 22 BNA Lan. RErL
REP. (Wages and Hours) 1392 (1948).
69. Ibid. See also 3 CCH LAB. LAw REP. (Wages and Hours) 1129,040 (1948), 23
BNA LAB. REL REP. (Wages and Hours) 1479 (1943).
70. 3 CCH LAB. LAw REP. (Wages and Hours) 129,014 (1943), 22 BNA LAm.
REL. REP. (Wages and Hours) 1343 (1948). This is in accord with the Administrator's
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THE LEGISLATIVE REMEDY
Employers and a considerable part of organized labor have voiced
their dissatisfaction with the effects of the Bay Ridge case.7 Premium
pay agreements arrived at in good faith mustnow be revised to accord
with the new requirement of excessiveness. Such revision may well be
complicated by the fact that many of the pre-Bay Ridge contracts
specified premium payments more generous than those required by the
Act. Employees will be jealous of these generous premiums and, quite
understandably, will seek to retain them. On the other hand, mainte-
nance of such contracts results in substantial increases in the labor costs
of the employer because such premiums will now be included in "reg-
ular rate" and will not be credited to the overtime required by the Act;
in addition, there is imposed the administrative expense of computing
varying regular rates for each employee when contract overtime does
original interpretation. Interpretative Bulletin No. 4, 14, 3 CCH LAD. LAw REP. (Wages
and Hours), 1124,478 (1948), 1944-1945 WH MAN. 157. This original position had
been modified by the Administrator, however, to permit the employer to elect to compute
the overtime compensation due in such cases either on the basis of (1) the average hourly
rate or (2) the basis of straight-time rate applicable to the work performed during the
overtime hours. 3 CCH LAB. LAw REP. (Wages and Hours), 125,520 (.24 and .248)
(1948), 1944-1945 WH MAN. 183, 229. This was in accord with practice permitted under
the Walsh-Healey Act, 49 STAT. 2036 (1936), 41 U.S.C. § 35-45 (1946), which relates
to employment by Government contractors. According to the recent opinion letter, su1pra,
the election has not been permitted since June 17, 1947 when the Wage and Hour Divi-
sion announced that enforcement policies of the Department of Labor (as they relate to
the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Walsh-Healey Act) would be carried out on the
basis that all employers subject to the Acts are responsible for strict compliance. 13
FED. REG. 3915 (1947). However, Administrator McComb referred to this practice in a
report submitted on November 25, 1947 to House Subcommittee No. 4 with no implica-
tion that this policy had been rescinded. Hearings before Subcomnittee No. 4 of the
Conmnittee on Education and Labor, House of Representatives, on Proposed Amend-
ments of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 2617 (1947). Regu-
lations under the Walsh-Healey Act were revised, effective October 22, 1948, to require
the averaging method only, thus establishing uniform practice under two Acts. 13 FVD.
REG. 6214, 23 BNA LAB. Ryu. REP. (Wages and Hours) 3105 (1948).
71. The National Ass'n of Manufacturers, the International Longshoremen's Ass'n
and the American Federation of Labor all participated in the Bay Ridge case as anic
curiae opposing judgment for the employee plaintiffs. The Chamber of Commerce of the
United States has announced support of remedial legislation. Daily Labor Report No,
196 (1948). The Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division has stressed the need
for legislative action, 22 BNA LAB. RaL. R a. (Wages and Hours) 1457 (1948), Daily
Labor Report No. 206, A-4 (1948), and has proposed a specific amendment. See note
90 infra and text thereto. Since the Bay Ridge decision, the I.L.A. has urged labor and
industry to unite in support of legislation to permit collective bargaining agreements to
determine statutory regular rate, 22 BNA LAD. REtL. REP. (Wages and Hours) 1459
(1948), Daily Labor Report No. 205 F-1 (1948), Daily Labor Report No. 212, A-14
(1948). The C.I.O. has not yet indicated support for any legislation. See 23 BNA LAD,
RE.. REP. (Wages and Hours) 1491 (1948), Daily Labor Report No. 228, A-1 (1948).
But see statement on behalf of CIO, Daily Labor Report No. 21, F-1 (1949).
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not meet the test of "overtime premium" laid down by the Court.
Negotiation of new contracts after the expiration of such agreements
will likewise be hampered, and, in some instances, work stoppages may
result.
72
The fundamental changes wrought by the Court in the concept of
overtime pay, with its attendant disruption of wage payment practices
under a very large percentage of labor contracts, point the need for
swift legislative action. The need. for legislation is further illustrated
by the inequitable results produced by the completely artificial dis-
tinctions which the Administrator has had to make in his attempts to
mitigate the effect of the Bay Ridge decision. For example, premium
payments for Saturdays and Sundays may both be treated as a true
overtime premium if the workweek starts on Monday, but not if the
workweek starts on any other day of the week.73 And a premium pay-
ment for pre-shift time may not be treated as a true overtime premium
-unless the employment contract designates the workday as twenty-
four consecutive hours and such pre-shift time exceeds a bona fide
daily standard within such a twenty-four hour period.74 Needless to
say, in most cases, it is pure happenstance whether existing labor
contracts contain such magical clauses.
But even if the Administrator's interpretations did satisfactorily
resolve the various problems, they are purely advisory and subject to
contrary interpretations by the courts.75 Employers may naturally
hesitate to enter into agreements calling for premium payments
presently regarded by the Administrator as true overtime, when the
72. Such results were forecast by the Department of Justice in its petition for re-
hearing in the Bay Ridge case, Daily Labor Report No. 122, D-1 (1948), and the Ameri-
can Federation of Labor, as amicus curiae, in its brief in support of the petition for rehear-
ing, Daily Labor Report No. 193, D-1 (1948). This is e.'emplified by the longshoremen's
strike on the Atlantic Coast in November, 1948, which resulted at least in part from
disagreement between stevedoring companies and the International Longshoremen's Ass'n
as to contract provisions to take the place of the premium pay provision before the Court
in the Bay Ridge case. See the statement of the stevedoring companies, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 24, 1948, p. 10, col. 3. The longshore strike was eventually settled upon the basis
of a temporary contract utilizing the provisions of §7(b) of the Act which permit em-
ployment up to twelve hours daily or fifty-six hours weekly without statutory overtime,
subject to a limit of 1,000 hours in any period of twenty-six consecutive Vecks. Both
parties contemplate an early revision of the law to permit operation under the traditional
form of contract, and have received assurance of support for such a revision from the
Secretary of Labor. Daily Labor Report No. 228, A-1 (1948). See also statements sub-
mtted to the House Committee on Education and Labor of the 81st Congress (which
started hearings last Jan. 27, 1949) by Walter Mason, AFL national legislative repre-
sentative and Louis Waldman, general counsel to AFL's International Longshoremen's
Ass'n, which appear in Daily Labor Report No. 21, G-1, H-i (1949).
73. See notes 63 and 64, .spra.
74. See notes 66 and 67, supra.
75. See note 6, mupra.
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basis for the Administrator's position is doubtful.7" Nevertheless, an
employer's refusal to grant premium pay on this ground may well be
criticized by employee-representatives who wish to continue old or to
obtain new contract provisions calling for extra pay.
Amendment of the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards
Act to meet the problems raised by the Bay Ridge case has been the
subject of increasing Congressional attention since the District Court's
decision in early 1947. Subcommittees of the House and Senate, con-
ducting hearings on proposed amendments of the Fair Labor Standards
Act during the Eightieth Congress, devoted a substantial portion of
their time to testimony concerning the so-called "overtime on over-
time" problem.77 Both subcommittees adjourned, however, without
any agreement as to either the form or the objects of such an amend-
ment.
All of the proposals introduced in the Eightieth Congress sought to
solve the problem in whole or in part by amending section 7 (a) to per-
mit parties to collective bargaining agreements or employment con-
tracts to establish regular or overtime rates for use in computation of
overtime pay. However, the latitude to be permitted the parties varied
considerably in each proposal. H. R. 2230 78 required only that the
designated regular rate be "not less than" the minimum wage specified
in section 6 of the Act. H. R. 4387 7 added the requirement that the
rate be designated by a "bona fide" labor or employment contract.
76. For example the Administrator has ruled that in determining the practice of the
parties to a contract, the practice of the plant or group of which an employee is a mem-
ber, not the practice of an individual employee, governs. See p. 365 supra. Compare the
statement of the Court in the Bay Ridge case, 334 U.S. 446, 473 (1948), "If the govern-
ment means that any extra pay to an employee for work outside regular working hours
of the group of employees is to be excluded from the computation of the regular rate,
we do not think that contention sound. . . The work schedule of other individuals in
the same general employment is of no importance in determining regular working hours
of a single individual. . ." See, also, 149 Madison Ave. Corp. v. Asselta, 331 U.S. 199
(1947), in which, referring to the practice of paying overtime to employees who were
absent during the workveek for excusable cause, the Court declared at page 205: "The
payment of 'overtime' compensation for non-overtime work raises strong doubt as to
the integrity of the hourly rate upon the basis of which 'overtime' compensation is calcu-
lated."
77. Hearings before Subcommittee No. 4 of the Committee on Education and Labor,
House of Representatives, on Proposed Amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947) passim. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Com-
mittee on Labor and Public Welfare, United Slates Senate, on Bills to Amend the Fair
Labor Standards Act, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948) passim. The House Subcommittee
held hearings during November and December 1947, the Senate Subcommittee during
April 1948.
78. 93 CONG. REc. 1480 (Feb. 26, 1947) (by Mr. Plumley, R., Vermont).
79. 93 CoNG. REc. 10284 (July 25, 1947) (by Mr. Goodwin, R., Mass.).
[Vol. 58: 353
1949] REGULAR RATE AND THE BAY RIDGE CASE 373
The approach followed in H. R. 6534 8" couples provisions defining
certain types of payments as "overtime premiums" 81 (to be excluded
from the statutory regular rate and creditable to statutory overtime
compensation) with recognition of "overtime rates" established by
custom or individual labor contract.82 In this last bill, such an "over-
time rate" must be at least one and one-half times any lower rate,
"not proved to be a fictitious rate" established by custom or individual
labor contract, payable for the same work at other hours of the day
or on other days.
In S. 2386, 31 contractual designation of "overtime" by collective
bargaining agreement is permitted subject only to the limitation that
"basic wage payments" and certain production bonuses and other in-
centive payments must be included in computing regular rate.84 In
80. 94 CoNG. REc. 5S92 ( ay 12, 194S) (by Mr. Goodwin, R., Mass.), to supersede
H.R. 4387, note 79 supra. Identical with H.R. 6534, except for minor variations in punctua-
tion, are S. 2728, 94 ConG. REc. 6476 (May 24, 1948) (by Sen. Wiley, R., Wis.), and S.
2832, 94 CONG. Rnc. 7546 (June 8, 1948) (by Sen. Butler, R., Neb.). Sen. Wiley introduced
a bill identical with S. 2728, sitpra, at the start of the 81st Congress. S. 252, 95 Coic. Rmc.
85 (Jan. 6, 1949). All of these bills were referred to the Committee on the Judiciary in the
House and Senate, respectively, since they would deprive the courts of jurisdiction to enter-
tain suits for overtime compensation except as provided therein, and thus would have retro-
active application. This approach was taken in the Portal-to-Portal Act.
81. In H.R. 6534, mipra note 80, the term "overtime premium" means "that portion
of any overtime rate that is paid because the employee has previously worked a specified
number of hours during a specified period or because of the time of day or the day of
the week or year the work is performed."
82. In HR. 6534, supra note 80, the term "overtime rate" includes "any rate of at
least one and one-half times any lower rate, not proved to be a fictitious rate established
by custom or individual labor contract, payable for the same work at other hours of the
day or on other days, and includes any other true overtime rate."
83. 94 CONG. REC. 3559, 3560 (March 25, 1948) (by Sen. Ball, L, Minn.). S. 2386
contains a long and detailed definition of "regular rate" with -variations for employers
covered by collective bargaining agreements and those who are not. It is otherwise gen-
erally amendatory of the entire Act.
84. S. 2386, §3(iz)(3), supra note 83, provides in part: "In computing the 'regular
rate of pay' of an employee employed under a bona fide collective bargaining agreement-
"(A) there shall be included in normal, straight-time compensation-
"(1) basic wage payments, whether at an hourly rate, day rate, piece rate or salary;
"(2) production bonuses and other incentive payments distributed not less frequently
than monthly ...
"(3) such other payments ... as are not excluded by designation as 'overtime' pay-
ments in the provisions of such agreement or by an express provision thereof;
"(B) there shall be excluded from normal straight-time compensation and shall be
credited to overtime compensation-
"(1) payments which are creditable under the provisions of section 3(n) (1) (B),
"(2) payments designated as 'overtime' payments or otherwise made creditable to
overtime by the provisions of such agreement .. "
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addition, certain types of "overtime payments" are to be excluded from
statutory regular rate and credited to statutory overtime pay.8
Generalized provisions permitting contractual specification of reg-
ular or overtime rates would certainly eliminate the problems occa-
sioned by the Bay Ridge case. A fundamental shortcoming of such
proposals, however, is that they do much more; they permit almost
complete nullification of the statutory purposes. If the purposes of
spreading employment and providing extra compensation for long
hours still justify the retention of the overtime provisions of the Act,80
it would seem inadvisable to permit parties to labor contracts to
thwart them in almost any way they wish.
The implications of completely unrestricted power are apparently
recognized by the authors of H. R. 6534 and S. 2386, for those measures
contain restrictions upon its exercise. Thus, H. R. 6534 requires that a
contractual overtime rate be one and one-half times any lower rate
"not proved to be a fictitious rate." The latter phrase, however, would
seem to beg the question completely. "Fictitious rate" is undefined.
Presumably, it might result in the rate being tested under the stand-
ards developed in the Helmerich & Payne, Youngerman-Reynolds, and
Harnischfeger cases; any rate different from that actually paid for
hours normally or regularly worked might then be considered fictitious.
Such a test applied to the facts of the Bay Ridge case would produce
precisely the same result as was there achieved, although the reasoning
would be that of the Circuit Court of Appeals in that case. Since the
bill was conceived with the facts of the Bay Ridge situation in mind,
it is doubtful that its author intended such a result. Another possible
test of "fictitious rate" might be whether the rate was in fact paid for
any hours worked, without regard to their normalcy or regularity. If
this is intended, there is virtually unlimited freedom to contract and
any assumed safeguard is quite illusory. At best, undefined "fictitious
85. S. 2386, §3(n)(1)(B), supra note 83, provides: "there shall be excluded from
normal, straight-time compensation and shall be credited to overtime compensation for
the purpose of section 7-
"(1) overtime premiums paid for work performed in excess of the normal week day
or workweek scheduled in good faith by established practice or a collective-bargaining
agreement, and
"(2) overtime premiums paid for work performed outiside of the normal workday
or workweek scheduled in good faith by established practice or a collective-bargaining
agreement, including premium payments for work performed on Saturdays, Sundays, and
holidays;"
86. The economic desirability of repealing the overtime provisions of the Act was
considered by House Subcommittee No. 4. See particularly testimony of Paul U. Ny-
strom, Professor of Marketing, School of Business, Columbia University, Hearings be-
for Subcommittee No. 4 of the Cominttee on Education and Labor, House of Rcpre-
sentatives, on Proposed Amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. 799-837 (1947).
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rate" would probably lead to litigation comparable to that caused by un-
defined "regular rate." 87
The provisions of S. 2386 give rise to similar ambiguities and prob-
lems of interpretation. Under that bill, "basic wage payments," to be
included within the statutory regular rate computation, is undefined,
and, therefore, hardly more illuminating than the term "regular rate"
itself. There is also considerable question as to the wisdom of that
particular measure's establishment of separate standards for employers
who are parties to collective bargaining agreements and those who
are not s
Attempts to meet the danger that statutory revision will nullify 'the
statutory purposes by introducing such generalized terms as "fictitious
rate" or "basic wage payments" will at best create new problems of
interpretation. In dealing with the complicated situations which are
involved, some permissive provision leaving discretion to those fram-
ing the collective bargaining agreement is probably needed. But such
permission must be limited. It would seem that the most desirable
course would be to grant the requisite statutory permission only in
terms of the specific situations to be corrected."
Another useful statutory technique is to define certain specific types
of payments as overtime payments, as was done to a limited degree in
H. R. 6534 and S. 2386. This approach enables the legislator to limit
the scope of such provisions to the precise situation which he , ishes
to remedy. The best illustration of this particular technique is the bill
submitted by the Wage and Hour Administrator to the House and
Senate Committees shortly after adjournment of the last regular ses-
87. Compare statement of California State Brewers Institute suggesting the addi-
tion of the word "fictitious" to S. 2386, Hearings before a Subconinittee of the Committee
on Labor and Public Welfare, United States Senate, on Bills to Amcnd le Fair Labor
Standards Act, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 1116, 1117 (1948).
88. Representatives of organized labor almost without exception criticized this portion
of the bill. Id., at 128, 154, 478, 510, 523, 864, 865, 828, 1026, 1243, 1252. The Secretary
of Labor voiced similar criticism. Id., at 168. See also the analysis of S. 236 submitted
by the Department of Labor. Id., at 176. The International Longshoremen's Ass'n, how-
ever, supports such proposals. Id., at 1069, 1070, and see statements of Louis Waldman,
I.L.A. general counsel, reported in 22 BNA LaB. REL REP. (Wages and Hours) 1459
(1948), Daily Labor Report No. 21, H-1 (1949).
89. Of the various problems presented by the Bay Ridge decision, the only one which
seems incapable of practical solution by specific statutory language alone is the prob-
lem presented by casual or sporadic employment-where there are no hours of the day
or days of the week normally or regularly worked. To cope with that situation, some
permission to designate overtime rates by contract, custom or practice seems neces-ary.
The permission can and should be worded in terms of that situation only. Compare the
statement on behalf of the C.I.O. by Irving J. Levy, general counsel of the U.A.W., to
the House Committee on Education and Labor, 81st Congress, February 1, 1949, reported
in Daily Labor Report No. 21, F-I, F-6 (1949).
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sion of the Eightieth Congress." The Administrator's bill is a com-
prehensive amendment of section 7(a) and is designed to remedy not
only Bay Ridge problems but various other questions which have arisen
in connection with the interpretation of statutory regular rate." The
scheme of the bill is to define statutory regular rate as including all
remuneration paid to or on behalf of an employee, except certain
enumerated payments. These enumerated payments relate to such
matters as gifts, time not worked, bonuses, pension plan contributions
and overtime; creditable toward statutory required overtime are:
"Extra amounts paid as overtime compensation for hours worked,
in any day or workweek, in excess of eight in a day or 40 in a work-
week or the employee's normal working hours or regular working
hours, as the case may be . . .
and also:
"Amounts paid as extra compensation for hours worked, on Satur-
day or Sunday or on a recognized holiday, or on the sixth or
seventh day of the workweek, or for hours worked outside the em-
ployee's normal working hours or regular working hours where
work at such times is paid for at a rate of at least 50% in excess
of the bona fide rate applicable to the same work performed at
other times." 92
Although the overtime pay provisions in the Administrator's proposal
solve most of the problems raised by the Bay Ridge case, they fail to
remedy the precise situation there involved-the determination of over-
time payments where, because of the casual or sporadic nature of
employment, there are in fact no hours of the day normally or regularly
90. 3 CCH LAB. LAW Rzs'. (Wages and Hours) 129,009 (1948); 22 BNA LAD.
REL. REP. (Wages and Hours) 1317 (1948). The bill is also set forth and fully dis-
cussed by the Administrator in his 1948 annual report. AziN. REP. OF WAGE AND HOUit
PUBLIc CoNTRACT DrsioNs, U. S. DmP. OF LABOR 61 et seq. (1948). The provisions of
the Administrator's bill form the basis of several proposals introduced in the 81st Con-
gress which are discussed infra.
91. Particular attention is given to clarification of the status of bonuses, profit-shar-
ing payments, and employer contributions to employee benefit plans in the computation of
statutory regular rate. The Wage and Hour Division takes the position that modification
of the term "regular rate" is necessary to permit "certain types of profit-sharing plans
and arrangements for time and one-half pay or better for work during specified hours of
the day, or days of the week. The very purpose and desirability of such pay arrange-
ments are frequently defeated by the requirement that such payments must be Included
in the regular rate of pay in computing overtime compensation." ANN. REP. OF WAGE
AND HoUR AND PUBLIC CONTRAcrs DivisioNs, DEPT. OF LABOR 52 (1947).
92. See note 90 supra.
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worked.9 3 Nor does the bill contain any provision authorizing the use
of the group rather than the individual pattern in determining normal
or regular hours.
An additional question arises with regard to the provision that no
payment for work on designated days or outside of normal or regular
hours can be credited to statutory required overtime unless it is at
least 50% more than the bona fide rate for the same work performed
at other times. This sort of limitation introduces an e.xtraneous factor.
It is undoubtedly true that, in the past, the 50% premium has often
been cited as indicative of a true overtime rate, as distinguished from a
mere differential paid for a less desirable shift.9 4 If,.however, the basic
tests of an overtime rate are to be whether the rate is paid for hours in
excess of, or outside of other hours, or on certain designated days,
there seems little reason for adding the 50% ratio to the already existing
tests of what constitute overtime rate." It would seem quite enough to
rely on the basic provision that time in excess of forty hours must be
paid for at one and one-half times the regular rate; that proviso insures
that any payments which are recognized as overtime premiums must
average 50% higher than the regular rate.
The Administrator's bill, as did S.2386, poses the problem of whether
it is advisable at this time to enact a general definition of statutory
"regular rate" into the law. Both bills seek to deal with other problems
in addition to those raised by the Bay Ridge case. In so doing, however,
only a portion of existing law is to be changed. This being so, a gen-
eralized definition apparently codifying the long line of case law would
be undesirable. It would introduce the not inconsiderable variables of
statutory construction, both as to language and intent. Codification
of regular rate would also limit the ability of the courts to keep the Act
flexible so that it can be applied to new situations. Unless wholesale
changes are intended in the meaning of statutory regular rate, and,
certainly, such are not required to correct only BayRidge case problems,
a general definition of statutory regular rate at this time would seem
93. The Administrator himself ackmowledges this omission, stating that he is prepar-
ing another proposal for the solution of the problem. A.xxi. REP. OF THE ANV %G AND HoUn
UnM PUBLIC CONTRACTS Dmsioxs, U.S. DEFT. OF LAron 71 (1948).
94. For example, one of the major premises of the defense in the Bay Ridge case was
that a 507o differential is indicative of true overtime. This argument was accepted by
the District Court. 69 F.Supp. 956, 960 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
95. "The principle involved is that the purpose and nature--and not the quantity--of
the payment warrants the exclusion." Committee on Labor and Social Sccurity Legisla-
tion of the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York, REP. 0:1 NVAGE AND Hourm Lrczs-
LATION wrrH SPEciFIc REFPENmcE To TBE OvEaRTru-oz-OTnTu = Pnciur.n 5 (Jan. 18,
1949). It should be noted that the Supreme Court, in the Bay Ridge case, imposed no
such restriction in announcing its test of excessiveness, nor does the Administrator propose
to apply the 50% ratio to payments computed with reference to excessiveness.
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unwise; the content given to "regular rate" should be left to its case-by-
case development.
Whether it is sought to solve only Bay Ridge case problems, or other
problems as well, it would seem that the statutory technique of simply
enumerating certain types of payments which are to be excluded from
regular rate, and some of which may be credited to overtime, will most
satisfactorily do the job. However, the coupling of such an enumeration
with the provision that all remuneration other than the enumerated
types is to be part of the regular rate, as in the Administrator's bill,
introduces an unnecessary and undesirable rigidity in the law.
In the opening weeks of the Eighty-first Congress several measures
dealing with the "overtime on overtime" problem have been advanced
by the Chairmen of the House and Senate Committees. The earliest
of these, H.R. 858, 11 recites in its preamble an intention to clarify the
overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act as applied in the
stevedoring and building construction industries. It makes no attempt
to define "regular rate"; instead, it would exclude from the statutory
regular rate computation and make creditable to overtime, premium
pay for: (1) work on Saturdays, Sundays, or holidays, or on the sixth
or seventh day of the workweek; (2) work outside of the hours "estab-
lished in good faith" by the applicable employment contract or col-
lective bargaining agreement as the basic, normal or regular workday
or workweek. To qualify, such premiums must be at least 50% more
than the rate established in good faith by such contract or agreement
for like work performed during non-overtime hoursY
96. 95 CoNG. Rrc. 77 (January 5, 1949) (by Mr. Lesinski, D. Mich.). It was drawn
at the Department of Labor after consultation with interested labor and industry groups.
Daily Labor Report No. 4, A-3 (1949). See also 23 BNA LAD. REL. REP. (Wages and
Hours) 1529 (1948). Its counterpart in the Senate is S. 336, 95 Com. Rrc. 181 (January
13, 1949) (by Sen. Thomas, D. Utah).
97. H.R. 858, note 96 supra, provides for the addition of a new subsection 7(e) to
read:
"(e) For the purpose of computing overtime compensation payable under this sec-
tion to an employee-
"(1) who is paid for work on Saturdays, Sundays, or holidays, or on the sixth or
seventh day of the workweek, at a premium rate not less than one and one-half times
the rate established in good faith for like work performed in non-overtime hours on other
days, or
"(2) who, in pursuance of an applicable employment contract or collective bargaining
agreement, is paid for work outside of the hours established in good faith by the contract
or agreement as the basic, normal, or regular workday (not exceeding eight hours) or'
workweek (not exceeding forty hours), at a premium rate not less than one and one-half
times the rate established in good faith by the contract or agreement for like work per-
formed during such workday or workweek, the extra compensation provided by such
premium rate shall not be deemed part of the regular rate at which the employee is em-
ployed and may be credited toward any premium compensation due him under this section
for overtime work."
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This proposal is subject to several serious objections. First in view
of the acknowledged effect of the Bay Ridge decision upon all industry,
there seems little justification for limiting corrective legislation only
to the stevedoring and building construction industries except, possibly,
in a temporary measure. In addition, like some of the other measures
already discussed, H.R. 858 permits the parties to labor contracts too
general a discretion to designate regular and overtime rates by contract.
The effect of limiting the permission to the "good faith" of the parties
in establishing a basic or normal workday or workweek would seem no
different from the "fictitious rate" proposals in the Eightieth Congress.
Either the measure may be completely ineffective because a basic work-
day or workweek different from that in fact worked might not be re-
garded by the courts as "established in good faith" under the decisions
heretofore noted; or the parties will be able to thwart the purposes of
the overtime provisions of the Act by establishing any workday or
workweek agreed upon in good faith. The inadequacy of this "good
faith" requirement rests primarily in the fact that the interests of the
particular parties involved may often be served best by ignoring that
which Congress would protect-the spreading of employment via
premium pay.93 As to the requirement that the premium must be at
least 50% in order to qualify as true overtime, the reasons for its un-
desirability have already been indicated in the discussion of the bill
drawn by the Wage and Hour Administrator.
A second proposal which has achieved prominence in the Eighty-
first Congress, S. 653,11 is a general revision of the Fair Labor Standards
Act which would amend section 7 with provisions which combine H.R.
858 and a somewhat revised Administrator's bill. Like the Adminis-
trator's proposal, it defines "regular rate" as including all remuneration
received for employment except certain enumerated types of pay-
ments.00 The enumerations are similar to the Administrator's except
98. For example, there would seem no safeguard at all against a strong and com-
paratively dosed union from establishing in perfect good faith a minimum "basic" work-
week or workday while in fact working long hours at high rates, with resultant high
earnings for its limited membership-all at completely cross purposes with the statutory
aim of spreading employment. Compare the statement of Irving J. Levy, general counsel
to the U.A.W., on behalf of the C.I.O., to the House Committee, Daily Labor Report No.
12, F-1, F-6 (1949).
99. 95 CONG. REc. 568 (Jan. 27, 1949) (by Sen. Thomas, D. Utah).
100. S. 653, note 99 supra, provides in §7(d):
"(d) As used in this section the 'regular rate' at which an employee is employed
shall be deemed to include all remuneration for employment paid to, or on behalf of, the
employee, but shall not be deemed to include * * *-
"(5) extra compensation provided by a premium rate paid for certain hours worked
by the employee in any day or workweek because such hours are hours worked in excess
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that there is added the provision of H.R. 858 excluding premium com-
pensation for hours outside of a basic workweek or workday "estab-
lished in good faith" provided such premium is at least 50%. This
proposal, while including some of the desirable features of the Admin-
istrator's bill, fails to eliminate the serious objection to a general def-
inition of "regular rate," and adds the objectionable device of a gen-
eral permission to designate overtime rates by contract without an
effective limitation.
Criticism of the type of permission to designate rates granted by
H.R. 858 and S. 653 is met to some degree by H.R. 2033.11 The over-
time provisions of this measure, which is also a general revision of the
Act, are, for the most part, similar to S. 653. However, in the section
permitting the exclusion from regular rate computation and credit to
overtime of premium payments for hours outside a basic, normal,
or regular work week or work day "established in good faith," there
is added the requirement that the basic, normal or regular work day
or workweek be "established in good faith in accordance with regu-
lations" issued by the Secretary of Labor. 10 2 Under the proposal,
of eight in a day or forty in a workweek or in excess of the employee's normal work-
ing hours or regular working hours, as the case may be;
"(6) extra compensation provided by a premium rate paid for worl by the employee
on Saturdays, Sundays, or holidays, or on the sixth or seventh day of the workweek,
where such premium rate is not less than one and one-half times the rate established in
good faith for like work performed in nonovertime hours on other days;
"(7) extra compensation provided by a premium rate paid to the employee, in pur-
suance of an applicable employment contract or collective bargaining agreement, for work
outside of the hours established in good faith by the contract or agreement as the basic,
normal or regular workday (not exceeding eight hours) or workweek (not exceeding
forty hours), where such premium rate is not less than one and one-half times the rate
established in good faith by the contract or agreement for like work performed during
such workday or workweek."
§ 7(f) provides:
"(f) Extra compensation paid as described in paragraphs 5, 6, and 7 of subsection
(d) shall be creditable toward overtime compensation payable pursuant to this section."
The principle point of difference from the Administrator's bill is the elimination of
amounts paid as extra compensation for "hours worked outside the employees' normal
working hours or regular working hours" in § 7(d) (5). It is presumably intended to
cover such types of payments by the provisions of § 7(d) (7), which is new.
101. 95 CoNG. REc. 758 (Jan. 31, 1949) (by Mr. Lesinski, D. Mich.).
102. Section 7 (d) (7) of H.R. 2033, note 101 supra, excludes from regular rate and
makes creditable to overtime:
"(7) extra compensation provided by a premium rate paid to the employee, in pur-
suance of an applicable employment contract or collective-bargaining agreement, for work
outside of the hours established in good faith, in accordance with regulations issued by the
Secretary under Section 4(c), by the contract or agreement as the basic, normal or regu-
lar workday (not exceeding eight hours) or workweek (not exceeding forty hours),
where such premium rate is not less than one and one-half times the rate established in
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authority is conferred upon the Secretary to issue appropriate regula-
tions to carry out and prevent evasion of the provisions of the Act.0 3
It is probable that under such a provision, the difficulties heretofore
envisaged in connection with a general permission to designate over-
time rates by contract would be avoided. Nevertheless, there would
seem to be serious doubt as to the wisdom of making the Secretary of
Labor the general arbiter of all overtime provisions in collective bar-
gaining and employment contracts. The magnitude of the task and
complexity and cost of administering substantive regulations of such
general applicability render the proposal of dubious value. It may
well be, however, that if the power to issue regulations in regard to
permission to contract (whether vested in the Secretary of Labor or
the Wage and Hour Administrator) were in connection with a permis-
sion to contract limited to specific situations incapable of being other-
wise dealt with, it would serve a useful purpose. But once again, the
vice of a too general permission to contract is evident.
A PROPOSED REvisiON OF SECTION 7(a)
Legislative efforts to remedy the situation created by the Bay Ridge
case should be directed toward the objective of legalizing those specific
wage payment practices generally accepted as in compliance with the
Act prior to the decision. Care should be exercised, in so doing, to
retain effective safeguards against contractual attempts to evade the
recognized purposes of the overtime provisions of the Act. The injec-
tion of unnecessary rigidity in the administration and interpretation
of the Act by a statutory definition of the term "regular rate" should
be avoided. It is submitted that the following proposed amendment
to section 7(a) of the Fair Labor Standards Act would satisfy these
criteria:
"The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, is
amended by adding at the end of subsection (a) of section 7 of
such Act the folloing:
'In determining the regular rate at which an employee is
employed, payments of the following types shall be excluded
from the regular rate and may be credited to the compensa-
tion required to be paid by this subsection:
'(1) premium payments for work done on Satur-
days, Sundays, holidays, or on the sixth or seventh
days of the worknveek of such employee;
'(2) premium payments for work in excess of eight
hours daily or forty hours weekly, or for work in ex-
good faith by contract or agreement for like work performed during such workday or
workweek."
103. H.R. 2033, § 4(c), note 101 supra.
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cess of a lesser number of hours daily or weekly
where such lesser number of hours is the number of
hours normally or regularly worked by such em-
ployee;
'(3) premium payments for work during hours of
the day or on days of the week outside the hours of
the day or the days of the week normally or regularly
worked by such employee;
'(4) premium payments for work during hours of
the day designated as overtime hours pursuant to
contract, custom or practice; provided, that by rea-
son of the casual or sporadic nature of the employ-
ment covered br such contract, custom or practice,
there are in fact no hours of the day normally or
regularly worked by such employee; and, provided
further, that such designation of hours of the day as
overtime hours shall be in accordance with regula-
tions which the Administrator is hereby authorized
to issue for determining the casual or sporadic na-
ture of employment contemplated by this subpara-
graph.
The pattern of employment of the group, if any, of employees
employed by an employer of which an employee is a member
shall be determinative of the number of hours and the hours of
the day normally or regularly worked by such employee. The
enumeration of the foregoing types of payments is not in-
tended to be exclusive of any other types of payments which
may properly be so excluded or so credited, or both.' "
[Vol. 58 :353
